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 The universal theory of state formation, as discussed by Weber, Tilly and others, 
is relevant and appropriate to Africa when properly applied.  Africa has her own unique 
history and the variables affecting state development, such as land tenure, remain the 
same.  The value of these variables is what differs from the European experience.  As 
such, state development in Africa remains strikingly similar throughout its history.  It is a 
struggle between the center and the periphery in which the center is hindered by three 
commonalities: lack of centralization, communal land ownership and patron-client 
systems.  These commonalities worked against centralization, each building on the other 
and helping the periphery maintain a degree of independence rarely seen in other regions 
of the world.  To understand modern Africa is to look at her past and see how remarkably 
constant her society has been.  After reviewing the available literature, this thesis delves 
into Africa’s past and shows how important it is to the understanding of her present 
condition.  In the end, it will draw out both domestic and international policy implications 
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This thesis seeks to understand the African condition from the bottom up.  In 
doing so, it look at the historical process in determining how state development in Africa 
differed from that in Europe.  By looking back at the historical record, the thesis extracts 
the necessary analytical variables for analyzing and discussing Africa.  In the end, it falls 
back on three social structures: lack of centralization, communal land ownership and 
patron-client systems. 
This thesis looks at new ways of analyzing and developing African institutions.  
Institution building is a historically rooted process, not a definition or established goal.  It 
begins by examining existing theory on state and state building (with its heavy 
dependence on observations from the European experience).  Determining that the 
European historical experience is insufficient in the understanding of sub-Saharan Africa, 
it turns towards the African historical record.  
Insight into the historical process of state development in Africa aids analytical 
understanding of the continent and facilitates policy making.  This approach sheds new 
light on the processes that drive Africa and lays the groundwork for further study.  This 
thesis shows that the village is the heart of Africa and that it is only by engaging the 
village that Africa will develop and emerge from the apparent chaos. 
In the end, the international community must allow African regimes to succeed 
and fail as warranted by their ability to connect with the village.  This might mean 
increased chaos and disorder in the short run, but from the ashes will emerge a stable and 
developing Africa, one that is true to its own particular history and social structures. 
Finally, this thesis will show that there can be a universal theory of state 
formation.  The same variables that dictate state formation in Europe apply in Africa, the 
difference being in the value of the variable.  African and Europe are different; they 
followed different paths but underwent similar processes.  One need not invent unique 




























Africa has fallen off the map.  Aristide Zolberg noted over three decades ago that 
“the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost 
institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent feature.”1  Little, if 
anything, has changed since.  Africa is slowly fading from the international scene.  It is a 
continent plagued with weak institutions, HIV/AIDS, refugees and conflicts, just to name 
a few of the hurdles obstructing the path towards security, stability and development.  
The challenges are overwhelming. 
Scholars fail to understand the current post-colonial crisis, too often seeing Africa 
through the western perspective, unable to look beyond into the African historical 
experience.  It is as though the institutions imposed upon the continent from Europe 
during colonization take primacy over the historically rooted indigenous ones.  
Everything that came beforehand, the various structures, institutions and mechanisms that 
allowed African societies to interact and develop suddenly disappeared – or never existed 
at all.   
Following from this failure to understand the nature of the African state is the 
concomitant failure of policies designed to address it.  The international community 
prescribes remedy after remedy, in awe at Africa’s apparent inability to cure itself.  
Whether the remedies are appropriate is rarely questioned.   Yet, the fact is that these 
remedies are often wholly inappropriate and based on an inadequate understanding of 
Africa.  More attention to the actual structures and institutions, along with a long-term 
outlook, would greatly facilitate helping Africa leave conflict and disorder behind. 
This thesis will avoid looking at Africa through ethnic or tribal lenses.  Ethnic and 
tribal conflicts are symptoms, not the condition.  It is too simplistic to simply label the 
situation ‘ethnic’ without attempting to look for the roots of what ails the continent.  
Ethnicity is a modern phenomenon with no visible history before colonialism.  This thesis 
will not delve into the nature of ethnicity other than to state that the ethnic problem is not 
                                                 
1 Zolberg, Aristide, “The Structure of Political Conflict in the New Sates of Tropical Africa,” 
American Political Science Review, p 70, March 1968 
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a historic one.  Rather, this thesis will look at social structures that govern the everyday in 
African societies. 
Thus, this thesis looks at new ways of analyzing and developing African 
institutions.  Institution building is a historically rooted process, not a definition or 
established goal.  Therefore, it will look to existing theory on state and state building 
(with its heavy dependence on observations from the European experience), but also to 
African history. 
Insight into the historical process of state development in Africa will aid 
analytical understanding of the continent thus facilitating policy making.  This approach 
will shed new light on the processes that drive Africa and lay the groundwork for further 
study.  This thesis hopes to show that the village is the heart of Africa and that it is only 
by engaging the village that Africa will develop and emerge from the apparent chaos. 
This chapter delves into state theory, and its application to Africa.  It looks at how 
analysts view African institutions and structures. First, it seeks to outline the template, 
terminology and hypotheses that are used in analysis of the state.  Once the terms of 
reference have been made plain, it considers whether those theoretical frameworks have 
been applied appropriately in the study of Africa. 
A. STATE THEORY 
The existing model of the state relies heavily on Max Weber.  According to 
Weber, the exercise of political power began with the ability to garner the necessary 
power to deal with both internal and external situations in the localized European 
community. These “chiefs” had two sides to them. On one hand, they were patriarchs in 
their families; on the other, they were the charismatic leaders of the community – the 
warlord, the hunter, the sorcerer, and most importantly, the arbiter.  This charismatic 
position was acquired without any regards to familial standing or by sets of rules.  This 
charismatic person became a permanent fixture of the community when warfare was 
common.2 
                                                 
2   For information on charismatic leadership and the rise of Kinship, read Gerth, H.  H., Mills, C. 
Wright, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, 1946. 
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The existence of a warlord did not depend on his rule over others, free or slaves.  
“His existence [depended] solely upon a chronic state of war and upon a comprehensive 
organization set for warfare.”3  As the warlord began ruling over the working masses, 
birth of a kingship and its royal administration come to being.   Upon establishment of 
the kingship, all those who had vested interests, including the charismatic lord, sought 
legitimacy to stabilize their rule.  The King was first a warlord, attaining his position 
through charismatic heroism.  With the King, came the birth of the state. 
In the end, the state was the result of an evolution of a political-territorial 
association gaining the monopolization of legitimate violence, or coercion.4  The state 
that arose from these processes became responsible for certain functions: legislative, 
police, administration of justice, the various branches of administration and the military 
administration.5 
As the state evolved so did the bureaucracy.6  The bureaucracy administered the 
state through bureaus or departments staffed with non-elected officials.  These officials 
were trained to do their job and bound by regulations.  This technocratic bureaucracy 
became the backbone of the state, allowing it to organize and exert its monopoly of 
coercion.  It increased the efficiency of centralized authority while limiting the effect of 
individual actors, constraining paths available to them.  This state formation process took 
place over centuries in Europe. 
This framework is predominant in studies of European state formation and state 
formation across the developing world.  Africanists have also adopted Weber’s 
framework.  Young and Turner, for instance, state that they “begin by considering the 
contemporary concept of state as it is universally used, with its implicit point of reference 
in the Western nation-state.”7 Others, such as Jackson and Rosberg are more implicit 
                                                 
3  Ibid, p 252. 
4 Ibid, pp. 904-907. 
5 Roth, Guenther (ed), Max Weber: Economy and Society Vol. 2, p 905, University of California Press, 
1978. 
6 For more information on the characteristics of and legal authority binding a bureaucracy, read Max 
Weber: Economy and Society Vol. 2 pp.  956-958 and Vol. 1 pp. 220-221. 
7 Young, Crawford and Turner, Thomas, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p 7, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
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when referring to the European template in stating that in Africa: “in general, personal 
regimes may be thought of as typical of transitional periods, when one institutional order 
has broken down and another is yet to replace it.”8   
Huntington9 emphasizes the weakness of the bureaucracy and government of 
developing states in relation to the others.  Throughout his thorough and well documented 
research, he maintains the focus of his analysis on the states and their associated 
structures.  He therefore does not see important alternative authority structures embedded 
in Africa historical experience, which continues to challenge and even block attempts to 
consolidate centralized Weberian state structure. 
Similarly, he does not acknowledge the indigenous political concepts of authority 
and legitimacy, nor does he acknowledge indigenous institutions and mechanisms of 
regulating the very conflict he is studying.  At one point, he refers to ‘traditional’ political 
systems, but focuses solely on the European experience.  He concludes by describing the 
historical traditional polities: the bureaucratic empire and the feudal system.  Even a more 
cursory glimpse at African history reveals no such ‘traditional polities.’ A close look 
would reveal entirely different ‘traditional structures.’ 
Peter Evans work is so firmly rooted in western theory that he states simply that 
“states remains as Weber defined them…”10 He then goes on to talk about the 
“bureaucracy of Zaire.”  In fact, Zaire lacks trained technocrats following standardized 
procedures whose positions are not based on the whims of immediate supervisors.  The 
public administration in Zaire is thoroughly patrimonial, with every indicator of 
bureaucratization (specialization, technocrats with regularly observed procedures, etc…) 
at an extremely low level.11  Evans also talks about Zaire having infrastructural power, 
yet it is apparent that the Zairian administration is completely unable to penetrate society 
and implement its decisions.  Regions act autonomously of the center, ignoring rules or 
                                                 
8 Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl, Personal Rule in Black Africa, p 5, University of California 
Press, 1982. 
9 Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 1968. 
10 Evans, Peter, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, p 5, Princeton University 
Press, 1995. 
11  Joseph, Richard, The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa, in Joseph, 
Richard (ed), State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, p. 68, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1999. 
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edicts that are of little to no relevance to them.12  Finally, Evans concludes that the ‘state’ 
directed its energies to preventing the emergence of social groups that might have an 
interest in its transformation.  If the ‘state’ does not have the capacity to implement its 
program, or the bureaucratic capacity to formulate it in the first place, this claim is 
empirically impossible.  Evans misuses terms and misrepresents the nature of the state in 
Zaire, precisely because he relies on Weberian theory to the exclusion of African reality. 
Continuing this trend, Callaghy glosses over African particularities in his analysis 
of Zaire stating that these “differences are important, but not in terms of the generic 
quality of absolutism as a form of organic-statist domination.”13  He emphasizes the 
patrimonial qualities of the French and Zairian states and their highly arbitrary nature.  In 
both cases, the state attempted to co-opt and replace locally based authorities as it sought 
to enhance its sovereignty, centralize control, and establish a more direct control over its 
population.  This would allow for greater resource extraction, while whittling away at the 
powers of traditional authority.  However, they had only limited success.  As in Louis 
XIV’s time, Zaire was faced with complex social organizations and traditional authority 
that continued to elude the regime.   
Callaghy’s comparative analysis is insightful, but he takes it too far.  After 
decades of effort under the reign of Louis XIV, the French state made measurable 
progress towards its goals.  Whilst in Zaire, central authorities have been unable to 
generate sufficient revenue and become self-supporting; they have in fact largely 
collapsed.   The central authorities were never able to control their people or develop 
indigenous sources of revenue. Similarly, the bureaucracy under Louis XIV grew more 
technocratic and more specialized.  Zaire’s public administration was, if anything, less 
technocratic and specialized by the end of Mobutu’s reign than it was at the beginning.  
Louis XIV’s army increased its autonomy and gained the monopoly of coercion.  Zaire’s 
army has made no progress in this area. For these reasons, the ‘state’ in Zaire was never 
able to monopolize the decision-making process, nor did it ever create a single operating 
                                                 
12 see Callaghy, Thomas M., The State-Society Struggle:  Zaire in Comparative Perspective, Columbia 
University Press, 1984. 
13 Ibid, p. 418. 
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legal system.  By adhering so tightly to Weber, Callaghy meticulously describes the state 
structures in Zaire, but in the end fails to understand that the state is completely hollow. 
In short, neither modernization theory nor the statist approach has properly 
addressed the African situation.  This brief analysis suggests the problems inherent in 
adopting theory without sufficient attention to historical foundations.  Weberian theory 
does have relevance to contemporary state building, but to discover and delimit its 
validity, scholars must use a broader lens.   
Jackson and Rosberg look for empirical evidence of the African state.14  They 
maintain Weberian notions and definitions of state in their analysis of Africa, but go one 
step further.  Although they agree that African states meet the legal requirements of 
statehood as set by the international community, they look at whether or not African 
states deserve such a label given the empirical evidence.  This is important for, unlike 
preceding scholars, they pay attention to the Weberian definition of state and bureaucracy 
in determining whether or not the terms apply in sub-Saharan Africa.  They conclude by 
determining that the African state does not hold up empirically and that the development 
of an empirical state might be at odds with the international recognition of juridical 
states.15 Yet, they are unable to fully let go of the Weberian framework and fail in 
sufficiently considering African historicity. 
Continuing this look at empirical attributes of statehood, Chabal and Daloz take 
Weber as a starting point in their analysis of the formations of modern states.16  They 
begin their inquiry by looking at the empirical realities of contemporary Africa. They 
argue that the state, as defined by Weber, is vacuous and ineffectual in the African 
context; unable to consolidate and never properly institutionalized.17  They make 
references to ancestral norms as incompatible with the notion of state, yet never look as 
to the processes driving such norms.  They accurately point out that the state is little more 
than a façade masking the African reality, yet fail to sufficiently account for African 
                                                 
14 Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl (eds), Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and 
Juridical in Statehood, World Politics 35, 1982. 
15 Ibid, p. 22. 
16 Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (eds), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, 
Indiana University Press, 1999. 
17 Ibid, p. 14. 
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historicity.  They content themselves by labeling the current African situation as one of 
personalized political relations.18  Albeit a step in the right direction, being able to look 
beyond the Weberian model, they too do not sufficiently account for African historicity 
and corresponding social structures.   
Bringing a little more historicity to the analysis, Jean-Francois Bayart starts with 
African countries and societies.  He delves beneath the hollow state and bureaucracy in 
an attempt to understand what ails Africa.  He criticizes western theory for including 
Africa in a wholly universal approach, forgetting the historical and cultural richness of 
African societies.19  Bayart argues that the African state is based on networks that lead to 
societal stratification based on access to the state.  The strategy of the heads of these 
networks is to capture and accumulate as much wealth as possible in order to redistribute 
to enlarge their networks.    “In other words, the social struggles which make up the quest 
for hegemony and the production of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in 
which all actors – rich and poor – participate in the world of networks.”20   This is a 
major step forward, in that Bayart, free from the blinder of western theory, is able to 
identify the centrality of patron-client networks in African society, and in its links to the 
state.  However, Bayart goes too far in shedding the western state model completely.  He 
misses commonalities with Europe that are enlightening, such as the stages involved in 
the centralization of power and state building. In discarding all theory, he makes any 
comparative analysis impossible. 
Analysis of the African state must draw upon western experience without 
imposing it wholesale upon Africa’s own history.  Ironically, Charles Tilly outlined a 
methodology for doing just this more than a quarter century ago.  Tilly’s extended 
introduction to The Formation of States in Western Europe has been widely discussed, 
developed, adapted and adopted.  However, it has not been applied to the study of Africa 
with the consistency and enthusiasm that Weber has.  Tilly outlines a ‘theory’ of state 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p. 16. 
19 Bayart, Jean-Francois, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, p. 5, Addison Wesley Longman 
Publishing, 1993. 
20 Ibid, p. 235. 
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formation in Europe, but also provides guidance on how his observations might be useful 
in the analysis of other world regions.   
In his study of Western European history, Tilly points out several commonalities 
of the European experience: 1) cultural homogeneity; 2) a peasant base complemented by 
landlords; and 3) the emergence of states from the midst of an extensive, decentralized, 
but relatively uniform political structure.  The European state developed from this very 
broad base, aided or abetted by several additional factors: a) the availability of extractible 
resources; b) a relatively protected position in time and space; c) a continuous supply of 
political entrepreneurs; d) success in war; e) strong ties between the central authorities 
and major segments of the landed elite; and f) an international context promoting the 
survival of some nation states and the disappearance of others.21  These factors, Tilly 
suggests, should drive much of contemporary state studies.  
However, Tilly warns that theories of social change assume an internal coherence 
and standardization of experience that is unlikely to hold up.  He counsels against 
believing that a recurrent social process governs all large-scale social change, and 
reminds scholars that “when our nineteenth century forebears [e.g. Weber] thought they 
were discovering laws of social process, they were usually reasoning within [the] 
confines of the capitalist world system they knew…”22 Thus, one must be alert to 
variability of social process across time and pace.  On balance, Tilly believes that 
European experience is relevant to the study of social processes elsewhere: conclusions 
drawn from exhaustive study of European history provide hypotheses for organizing the 
study of similar processes in other regions.  Nevertheless, these hypotheses must be 
carefully tested against empirical data.  This is where efforts to bring theory to bear on 
state building in Africa tend to fail. 
Jeffrey Herbst, in his latest book States and Power in Africa: Comparative 
Lessons in Authority and Control,23 forgoes this trend and looks at Africa over the last 
                                                 
21 Tilly, Charles, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 40-45, Princeton 
University Press, 1975. 
22 Ibid, p. 74. 
23 Herbst, Jeffrey, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
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several hundred years.  He heeds the advice of Tilly and seeks to analyze Africa through 
historically grounded huge comparisons of big structures and large processes.24  Herbst 
does not blindly superimpose the Western model on the Africa experience, rather, he is 
interested in discovering it through the historical context.   
Herbst talks about the European experience as being unique, not shared with other 
parts of the world.  He then delves into what he views as the essential dynamics of the 
African experience: costs of expanding authority, boundaries, and state systems.  In 
doings so, he makes many insightful contributions to the study of Africa.  Yet, his focus 
on geography and the center as a ‘state’ attempting to expand its power through space 
still retains a certain western bias towards centrally led processes and developments; he 
looks at Africa from the top down.  Albeit a good start, this thesis will focus on the most 
basic level of African society, the village, and the various social structures and processes 
that bind it and others together when looking at societal development in Africa. 
This thesis thus seeks to understand the African condition from the lowest 
common denominator.  The center has always tried to project its power outward; it is in 
its self-interest.  The most interesting variables are those that interact with the center and 
facilitate or hinder the process of power projection.  The focus of this thesis will be in 
examining various social structures, common throughout the African region, and how 
they functioned during the process of state development. 
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II. AFRICAN HISTORY 
Sub-Saharan Africa is a large region; it is not an undifferentiated mass.  In its 
analysis of African history, this chapter will draw out certain commonalities of the 
African experience shared by most of the continent while realizing that variations do 
exist.  Societies within the continent do not necessarily share the same developmental 
path, nor must they have the same outcome.  Nevertheless, this cursory look at African 
history will draw out generic themes within the African experience that will help 
analysts’ understanding of the continent as a whole.  
Africa has a rich and varied tradition of legitimate authority and institutional 
innovation.  Basil Davidson’s cursory look into Western Africa from 1000-1800 draws 
attention to various African societies:  all self-sufficient, most relying heavily on trade.  
International trade helped Ancient Ghana (300-1240) prosper, as its “towns and trading 
settlements became the go-betweens or middlemen between the Berber and Arab traders 
of the north and the gold and ivory producers of the south.”25 It is this middleman 
position rather than war and taxation that helped Ghana thrive and pay for its armies. The 
ultimate decline of Ghana paved the way for Mali (c. 1300-1600).   
Both Ghana and Mali established vast trading kingdoms.26  The Portuguese court 
even sent emissaries to Mali in hopes of trading European goods for their gold.  These 
early African rulers created and maintained salt and gold monopolies.  To do so, they had 
to build effective administrative infrastructure to enforce their control.  The historical 
record suggest that in order to avoid internal strife, the administration was very 
decentralized, focusing entirely on controlling access points to and from the mines and 
the main markets in which the goods were traded.  Thus, even though they rarely 
controlled the gold mines themselves, they effectively controlled the distribution of gold 
from the mines.   
Effective infrastructure and sufficient capacity was necessary to carry through and 
properly maintain control of trade.  A leader, very much like the Weberian charismatic 
                                                 
25 Davidson, Basil, A History of West Africa, p 39, Longman Group Limited, 1977. 
26 Curtin, Philip, and others, African History: From Earliest Times to Independence, pp. 73-99, p. 157, 
Addison Wesley Longman, 1995. 
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warlord, gathered enough support at the base to create the basis for such control: part of 
his tools were slaves his raiding party captured in turn used as an instrument of coercion 
in select areas.  The fact that many of these early trading regimes depended on slaves 
indicates that, unlike the European warlord, his African analogue had more difficulty in 
establishing a ‘charismatic’ position.  This warrants further investigation as to the 
possible causalities.   
Regardless, African trading kingdoms, networks and communities continued, 
much like early European polities, to rise and fall throughout the continent:  Senegambia, 
Songhay, Oyo, Mossi, Kanem-Bornu, and the Asante just to name a few.  African 
regimes were dynamic: political organizations were created, rose, and fell naturally in 
response to opportunities and challenges.27 The main reason for this constant expansion 
and contraction was the geographical location of the kingdoms.28  Most were in the 
Sahel, just south of the Sahara.  The desert edge was dangerous, open to both nomadic 
raids and subject to scarce rainfall: Ghana fell prey to both.  It took some time for Mali to 
successfully control the desert border and claim the monopoly of both salt and gold after 
the decline of Ghana.  The early African experience shares certain aspects of the 
Weberian model.  Chiefs rose within communities and those with a stake in his rule, to 
include the chief himself, began attempts towards greater centralization.  Unlike his 
European counterpart, the African warlord seemed to encounter social structures more 
successful in hindering his progress. 
The fact that these early kingdoms were so heavily reliant on trade and leaders 
encountered such difficulty in centralizing their authority helps to begin the discussion of 
commonalities in Africa history.  Why trade? Why could they not or did they not develop 
means of effectively taxing production? How did they build and sustain relatively 
effective administrative structures for controlling trade, and why could they not, or did 
they not, develop similar structures for penetrating their own societies?  An initial, very 
limited search for the answer to these questions reveal three overarching commonalties in 
African history that also present sharp contrast to the history of state-making in Europe.   
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These commonalities in turn deserve greater attention, but the aim of this thesis is to draw 
them out in hopes that more will be done in the future. 
A. LACK OF CENTRALIZATION 
Pre-colonial African polities were consistently marked by an absence of 
centralization.  This did not mean that individuals at the center were not trying to 
consolidate power, rather, the societies that they interacted with successfully resisted.  
The Mogho Naba, the Emperor of the Mossi within modern day Burkina Faso, was 
unable to bring all five kingdoms firmly under his rule.29  Other strongmen with near 
equal capacity, fought against his centralizing effort.  The King of Tenkodogo in 
particular, often went its own way, refusing to cede too much power to the center. He, 
like the Mogho Naba, drew his army from the men within his kingdom; this resulted in a 
balance of forces that could only be countered with the involvement of one of the three 
remaining Kings.  Rarely would one King help another interfere in the matters of another, 
and the historical record suggests that the Mogho Naba was no exception.  The Mogho 
Naba’s position was not based on a chronic state of war, and, unlike his European 
counterpart, he was not primarily a warlord. This small deviation from the European 
experience merits further exploration.  Nevertheless, the result was that the rather limited 
coercive capacity of the Mogho Naba hindered his efforts to centralize his rule. 
To complicate the centralization effort, the center was never fully capable of 
extracting necessary financial revenue from society.  There was little surplus, if any, to be 
collected.30 Society operated on a subsistence basis, each individual responsible for his 
own food production; in addition, the land was poor and technology rudimentary.  The 
villages did provide tribute, or a small amount of foodstuff, to their village chief who 
then passed a small percentage on through the chain until a small portion went to the 
central ruler.  Yet, tribute was insufficient in funding the needs of the central authority.  
Thus, African Kingdoms often generated necessary revenue through trade, or later 
through external campaigns in search for booty [i.e. slaves].  Because of this detachment 
of the center from the means of production, central authority remained largely 
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independent of village life.31  This differs from the European experience where landlords 
effectively controlled the peasant base and successfully managed to create surplus, in turn 
able to raise sufficient revenue to operate.  In Africa, the net result was an emphasis on 
controlling the center while little relative attention was paid to the hinterlands.32 
Of course, there were varying degrees of centralization within Africa.  Amongst 
the least centralized of African societies were the Tiv and the Ibo.  In these societies, 
authority was so dispersed that there was no permanent ruler.  Those who did hold 
positions of power did so only temporarily, over a small group of people with clearly 
defined limits.33  Village elders, priests and age groups were all responsible for certain 
aspects of the daily societal decision making process.  The priest might be in charge of 
determining the start and end of the harvest season, a very important responsibility given 
the focus on agriculture.  Yet, it would be the village elders who would chose a 
representative to present their greetings or grievance to another village or authority.  Such 
societies had overlapping authority that was diffused and inherently decentralized.34 
The Mossi Kingdom was somewhat more centralized.  The Mogho Naba, as King 
of Ouagadougou, officially controlled five provinces, which he placed under appointed 
ministers.  However, each of the other four provinces were under the rule of other 
‘Kings’ who often clashed with the appointed Imperial administrators.35  The Mogho 
Naba did not have a standing army to enforce his rule effectively over the other Kings.  
This could be attributed to both the lack of external threats and a subsistence-based 
economy.  The former did not necessitate the raising of a professional standing army; the 
latter complicated the Mogho Naba’s taking of the men away from the village for fear of 
severely disrupting the food supply, possibly causing famine and consequently creating 
significant domestic turmoil.   
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The Mogho Naba did have bodyguards drawn from the ranks of palace slaves.  He 
was not an exception as all five Mossi Kings had slaves from which to draw from for 
personal security.  This continued inability of the center to impose its will and coerce the 
periphery limited the Mogho Naba’s consolidation of power.  European state builders 
successfully created permanent and professional armies detached from the land that, in 
time, came to recognize only the authority of the center.  The best the Mogho Naba could 
do was to call upon other Kings to in turn call their Mossi males to form a standing army 
to meet external threats for limited times – or there would be no food. Thus, his inability 
to create a permanent army, detached from society, due to the subsistence economy 
complicated his quest to consolidate authority.   
The Asante Kingdom  (~1660-1890s) was perhaps the most centralized polity in 
Africa.  The Asante made great strides in centralizing authority over their two hundred 
year old history.  Indeed, with 18th century growth and elaboration, Kumase [the capital] 
had become significantly detached from the subsistence basis of the social order.36  This 
historical particularity is very noteworthy.  Albeit the historical record is not entirely 
clear, the Asante society produced landowners who were detached from the land, relying 
on others to tend to their fields, while they occupied themselves with the centralization of 
authority of the Asante regime.  Unlike their historical counterparts and for reasons that 
are not entirely clear, they were able to begin the process of overcoming a subsistence-
based economy and communal land ownership.  Yet, certain other aspects of Asante 
society are more familiar. 
The Asantehene37 operated within a framework and was subject to constraints.38  
This was due mainly to his weakness in relation to other strongmen in spite of his ability 
to have overcome subsistence-based economy at the very center of his rule.  The 
historical record suggests that the periphery remained largely tied to the land and further 
attempts at centralization were impeded by accompanying structures and the fact that the 
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Asante ruler relied on the cooperation of other rulers beyond the reach of his effective 
control to ensure his rule.39 
Most of greater Asante was administered under indirect rule.  Indirect rule was the 
process by which regulations were adopted for maintaining the subjects in a state of 
subjection, without any attempt to assimilate the conquered individuals within Greater 
Asante, which the Asante well knew would have met with strong opposition.40  These 
rules were practical, as the Asantehene gained more by their cooperation than having to 
conquer, or re-conquer them.  Thus, further centralization of the Asante Kingdom would 
have required great effort which would have only been likely in response to external 
threats; the historical record shows greater degrees of centralization were achieved by the 
Asante while competing and fighting against the British during the later half of the 
nineteenth century.   
Of all the three polities discussed here, only the Asante made significant progress 
in subjugating the village and centralizing its authority.  It all began with the ability of the 
first Asantehene to begin effectively overcoming the subsistence-based economy and the 
creation of a decentralized political structure largely due in part to the creation of a group 
of landowners not tied to their land and free to pursue other occupations.  The Asante 
appear to be the historical exception that proves the rule.  Unfortunately, the British 
conquest of the Asante and consequent exile of their ruler in the late nineteenth century 
ended the process of centralization and one cannot know for sure whether or not the 
Asante would have successfully overcome the decentralized structures. 
In general, the absence of centralization across time, space and institutional types 
suggests some areas for further analysis.  It appears that the resources at hand were 
unable to support greater centralization, instead tending towards a subsistence based 
economy that prevented central authorities from centralizing their rule as the social and 
practical consequences of overcoming it proved disruptive and unsustainable over the 
long run.  African rulers thus had to adapt to their own historical context in attempts to 
govern their societies and enforce their authority. 
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B. COMMUNAL LAND OWNERSHIP 
African societies were primarily subsistence based. The absence of private land 
ownership was a defining factor of pre-colonial African societies.  Each individual had 
access to the land; as such he could not be deprived from farming it.  The historical 
record shows that a ruler could not restrict an individual’s access to the land.  This in turn 
restricted the ruler’s ability to impose his will as he could not threaten an individual with 
the possibility of taking away his source of livelihood. 
Communal land ownership tended to create an egalitarian society and reduce 
individual differences as none could depend on surplus and all had to tend to their own 
land.  Even the Mogho Naba’s wives had to tend their own plots of land.41  This seems to 
suggest that the ruler and chiefs were subject to the same conditions as those they ruled.  
The record suggests that African rulers were deeply integrated within their societies and 
much more on equal footing than their European counterparts were.  Control of their 
population could not and did not rest on land ownership, a foreign and unattainable 
concept within the African historical record.   
Along with the lack of privatization was the relatively equal distribution of land. 
Land distribution was aimed at preventing its accumulation in the hands of a few 
privileged individuals.42  Private land ownership simply did not exist and the rights of the 
soil were collective property protected in the structures under the control of the land 
chief.  Landowners never emerged as the agricultural cycle barely sufficed for 
subsistence living and production requirement of the community.43  The result seems to 
be a rather fragile social equilibrium that did not tolerate much disruption.  This might be 
one aspect as to why war was a rather uncommon experience in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Nevertheless, societies based on subsistence farming carry an important implication: the 
difficulty of creating a group of individuals no longer ‘attached’ to the land and free to 
follow different pursuits.   
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Europe, on the other hand, had a group of landowners who could effectively tax 
those who worked their land as they were the acknowledged owners of and had the right 
to the land.   Landowners could effectively coerce and threaten their peasant population.  
Landownership conferred status and landowners would seek to increase the amounts of 
land under their control.  Historically, landowners were not always warlords, but 
warlords were always landowners.  This control of land was never part of the African 
experience. In fact, control of particular pieces of land was not critical to African 
societies.44 Further research might show that his landownership and corresponding need 
for more land [whose end result is fixation on borders] led to the chronic state of war that 
in turn led to the organization for warfare of which Weber talks about.   
In Africa, raids were occasionally conducted for slaves – until the advent of the 
Slave trade when such raids increased – but wars were rather uncommon.  African 
warfare tended to concentrate on seizing booty since it was hard to hold on to territory.45  
The historical record shows that conflict in Africa was not only more localized, but also 
not a chronic condition of the African experience.46   
The European experience shows that war is an important factor in the 
consolidation of the center.  Warfare necessitates defense made possible only through 
efficient and effective extraction.  As the properties of landlords were threatened, they 
allied themselves with the center to better defend their interests.  They provided revenue 
and manpower.  As the demands of warfare grew, so did the demands on the central 
structures.  They gained more prominence and capacity with time, eventually supplanting 
local landlords as the ultimate authority.   This entire system has its roots on 
landownership.  Landlords were effective allies to the center because they controlled the 
people on the land and could effectively extract resources to grow and maintain the 
central apparatus that was in turn completely detached from the land. 
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As African chiefs did not own the land, they had less power over their people.  
They could not threaten individuals by withholding their access to land.  The chief could 
tax parts of the peasant production, but too much would disrupt the village as there would 
not be enough to feed his constituents.  Additionally, should the chief become too 
demanding or unreasonable in terms of accepted practices, the historical record shows 
that it was not uncommon for villagers to simply walk away and migrate to another 
village for their right to land was never at issue and they were not tied to any one 
particular piece of land.  The chiefs were more dependent on popular consent as the 
village could, in drastic times, simply walk away and leave.47   
This rather tenuous control over the village made the chief a weaker ally for 
central authorities, as he could not effectively mobilize resources or conscripts as 
effectively.   Poor land conditions and natural scarcity limited conscription.  The chief 
could not provide men during certain key phases of the agricultural cycle, such as 
harvest.  Thus, the African chief was only of limited value in the ruler’s pursuit of greater 
centralization as his own resources and power were limited by the subsistence based 
economy and communal land ownership.  
C. PATRON-CLIENT SYSTEMS 
Formal political control in pre-colonial Africa was difficult and had to be earned 
through the construction of loyalties.48  There is no evidence that African rulers tried or 
wanted to control territory.  Given that control of land was not a consideration, control of 
people became the means by which to achieve their goals. 
Following from this, power at all levels in pre-colonial Africa tended to derive 
much more from control over people than control over land.  From this base, various 
personal dependence relationships took form.  An example would be an elder paying the 
bride price of a younger in exchange for labor.49  All these relationships became effective 
ways of regulating social interaction and created a framework in which societies 
operated.   
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The Baganda were one of many who developed an effective client-patron 
system.50  Clientship was based on two individuals of differing social status and social 
ranking; the client rends service in return for protection from the patron.  The Muganda 
called this system ‘Kusenga.’51  The underlying principle of the system was for one 
individual to attach himself to another.  Ganda society was thus divided between the 
patrons, the Mwami, and those their clients, the Mukopi.   
All these means of controlling others tended to have a redistributive affect.  For a 
patron to attract clients, he had to transfer resources downward.  Each villager in a 
Bagandan village gave a portion of his goods to the chief expecting him to carry most of 
the costs associated with the community [i.e. pay for funerals, provide for widows and 
orphans].  In return, the patron was exempt from hard labor and could call upon the men 
in the village for projects requiring such labor: one such chore was a regional patron 
asking his clients [village patrons] to provide men for road building.52 
The redistributive aspect of African societal relationships further complicated the 
centralization process.  It was difficult for any one person to hoard resources or 
accumulate enough for additional expenses and administration.  The ruler needed clients 
as it gave him some freedom from the land.  Clients permitted patrons to use their 
dependent’s productive labor in order to engage in trade and other pursuits aimed at 
strengthening their positions, resulting in a hierarchical structure that was particularly 
fragile as territorial authority depended solely on numbers and quality of clients.53  Most 
of his expenses thus went into maintaining his network giving him control of other men. 
Patron-client relationships were important in maintaining the integrity of the 
community.54  They were a means of weaving society together.  Each villager was 
supposed to support his chief, but the establishment of personal ties through client-
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patronage provided a more binding and personal tie between patron and village.  These 
relationships were another layer of the social structure in African society.  These ties 
could be used to bind different segments of society, binding the King to some, but not 
others.  To know about these relationships is to begin to understand how patron and 
client, each with their own interest, some powerful others powerless, came to 
cooperate.55 
African rulers sought to accumulate power.  Power being, according to Weber, 
“the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action 
even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.”56  Most of their 
available resources went towards gaining and increasing their power within their given 
community.  This process was carried out by the creation and establishment of 
dependence based relationships, such as client-patronage.  These client-patron 
relationships had a decentralizing effect on authority, as patrons constantly relied on a 
variety of other patrons and shared power in an intricate and delicate manner.  It was not 
simply a matter of controlling a demarcated piece of land, it was effectively controlling 
people.  Whereas chiefs were instrumental in their villages, patrons and clients interacted 
at various levels throughout society, different people controlling different aspects of 
people at different times.   
Africa simply has no history of landed elites.  Rather, she has a tradition of ‘Big 
Men’, patron-clientship and other non-land based dependent relationships.  African 
variants of the political entrepreneur spent most of their time developing and building 
their networks, sending most of the resources downward to stay on top.  European 
resources tended to flow upward towards the landed elite.  That, and the fact that Africa 
had fewer surpluses, greatly decreased the disposable income available to African elites.  
The central authority’s power was spread out through all the client-patron networks, 
rendering its consolidation much more difficult.  The King had to depend on numerous 
others, each with his own interests.  Whereas the European landlord could control the serf 
in exchange for access to his land, the African patron had to maintain his clients lest 
another more generous or politically capable patron come along. 
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All three commonalities – lack of centralization, communal land ownership, 
patron-client relationships – point to an economy and society, and therefore a polity, with 
the village at its center.  These villages were comprised of small groups of individuals 
who were mainly subsistence farmers, with an undifferentiated social division of labor in 
which even patrons participated either directly or indirectly in agricultural production.57  
This was the basis of Africa’s historical rhythm.  African history is thus primarily the 
story of the village.  Throughout the centuries, assortments of regimes and administrative 
apparatuses have emerged, each attempting to garner more power, with the goal of 
controlling the villages.  Central authorities had little help to draw upon in their quest for 
extraction of what were already limited resources.  These commonalities favored David, 
not Goliath.  Thus, the quest to rule Africa is the quest to find means or the capacity to 
effectively incorporate the village within a centralized regime.  History proves that 
incorporating the village into a centralized regime is no easy task, one that has never been 
fully accomplished.    
D. COLONIAL IMPACT 
Africa and Europe first came in contact through trade.  It was a process of general 
exchange that followed the worldwide maritime revolution of the fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century.58  By the end of the second half of the nineteenth century, European 
powers colonized virtually all of sub-Saharan Africa. 
The African colonial administrative apparatus was an extension of the European 
nation-state.  Effective occupation required the validation of claim to rule over a brief 
period.  This was accomplished through the establishment of rudimentary infrastructure: 
military outposts and modest administrative centers.59  The capacity to inflict military 
defeats on African rules was not enough to rule.  The direct use of armies was simply too 
expensive to maintain.  European powers had to find a low cost solution in effectively 
controlling their new territorial gains.  They turned to kings and chiefs that would 
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collaborate with them.  Colonial rule was thus two sets of structures co-existing side by 
side; on one hand was the colonial administration and military outposts, while on the 
other were traditional African rulers and structures.   
Whereas colonial powers were able to use existing structures to effectively extract 
resources in other regions of the world, they were confronted with the same historical 
difficulties African rulers had faced.60  In addition, colonial administrators had to operate 
with a new sense of scale.  Instead of simply controlling one region or historical polity, 
colonial state structures sought to administer different societies as one.  This made 
meeting the revenue imperative even more difficult.  It was excruciatingly difficult as 
subsistence-based economies were not rich in existing revenue to begin with.61 There 
were some exceptions, such as the palm oil in West Africa.  Colonial powers attempted 
various ways of extracting resources, but most failed.  The few that did were 
tremendously costly and encumbered the colonial regime with heavy debts.62 
Imported concepts and institutions common to the European experience, such as 
constitutions and centralized administration were superimposed upon existing pre-
colonial regimes and polities.  These concepts did not apply to the African experience 
and did not fit within the African historical context.  Further complicating the colonial 
task in the early stages, was the fact that there simply was not enough colonial 
administration to effectively impose such institutions.  Thus, colonial powers had to find 
ways of connecting with existing authority.    
The existing African structures and the colonial administration constantly 
interacted.  African chiefs and leaders sought to preserve whatever privilege they could, 
by accepting for better or worse positions offered them within the colonial administration 
while learning to manipulate it for their own benefit.63  Yet, their acceptance of colonial 
management did not necessarily imply the acceptance of the village.  Passive resistance 
to colonial administration from the African village was common, and there were early 
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instances of village uprisings.  In each case, the colonial powers had to come to terms 
with ways of controlling the population through more traditional means.  Colonial 
regimes had to work with and through the chiefs.  
The inability of colonial administrators to penetrate society resulted in this forced 
relationship between colonial administration and historical power.  The chiefs 
occasionally benefited from colonial attempts to strengthen their rule, yet still controlled 
the people and allocation of land at the base level.64  The colonial state was meeting some 
of the historical challenges of the African center, namely the inability to overcome a 
subsistence economy based on communal land ownership.  But whereas historical Africa 
developed a multi-layered means of tying society together in the form of patron-client 
relationships, colonial administrators attempted to control their society through western 
means based on their own experience. 
Migdal argues that colonial powers used three mechanisms to undermine and 
reconstruct political authority in the third world.  First, the colonialization process 
ostensibly involved changes in land tenure.65  Second, exposure to international 
capitalism facilitated the state’s ability to tax production.  Third, colonial governments 
opened up rural areas through the construction of transportation infrastructure.  In Africa, 
however, the particularities of history intervened forcefully to block these processes. 
Colonial administrators never abrogated the peasants’ right to land.  They could 
barely afford to keep a few military outposts and some administrative centers.  They 
relied on traditional chiefs and patrons to implement their rule.  Whereas these patrons 
facilitated the colonial process, they would not voluntarily undermine the basis of their 
own authority by drastically changing land ownership rights.  The colonial administrators 
in Africa never had the bureaucratic machinery of a Vietnam to extract surplus and 
effectively tax; their main currency was labor.66  Again, this labor was supplied to them 
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through intermediaries of whom they exercised minimal active control.  African colonial 
administrators simply could not implement the three mechanisms as Migdal suggests. 
Faced with the realities of African history, colonial administrators, instead, shifted 
their focus to finding ways to control the people.  In the formative phases of colonialism, 
administrators acquired formidable responsibility in the organization and direction of 
African labor.67  Nevertheless, colonial regimes were not all that more successful in 
extracting labor than they were with production.  Colonial attempts to extract labor were 
often rejected and led to numerous local peasant uprisings.68  Unlike their predecessors, 
they did not control the people through patron-client relations; additionally they did not 
want or need clients.  The main object of the European regime was to seek and extract 
revenue.  The European regime thus accommodated existing structures to minimally 
control African society in attempts to successfully extract revenue.  The African village 
successfully resisted centralized colonial control, frustrating colonial regime strategies by 
preventing the effective taxation of production and extraction labor. 
While the colonial administration claimed all powers of government in theory, it 
lacked the necessary manpower and knowledge to effectively back up its claim.69   Chiefs 
occasionally rebelled by refusing to pay taxes or supply labor pools, but these incidents 
did not last too long and rarely benefited the chief or those under him.  The chief was the 
interpreter of colonial policy to his subordinates.  His position was difficult as he was 
used for his connection to African society, but his continued rule depended heavily on an 
exogenous power.70  He was able to rule his constituency through patron-client 
relationships, but was now responsible to certain pressures exerted from colonial 
administrators in their own drive to control the people.  This likely affected his own 
capacity to control the population as the village began seeing him more as a puppet of the 
colonial administration.  
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The chief was in fact ‘collaborating’ with the colonial regime.  This was part of a 
cost benefit analysis on the part of the chief.  He could count on the support of the central 
regime to enforce his own rule vis-a-vis other individuals, and had support in his dealing 
with his inferiors as the colonial powers depended on the chief.71  This put him in an 
ambiguous position, as he was both the colonial link to tradition simultaneously 
depending on the regime for his position.  Thus, the colonial regimes used traditional 
authority but restricted its ability to maneuver.  The use of traditional authority was 
dysfunctional and led to the destruction of some of the chiefs who lost the very basis of 
their power.72 The record suggests that the village could disengage from the collaborating 
chiefs and live independently through their historical social structures, namely those 
village chiefs to whom they owed their primary loyalties.  Nevertheless, the chiefs who 
collaborated became the bureaucrats of the colonial administration and would soon 
compete for power with new westernized African elites. 
During colonization, colonial powers selected Africans to receive western 
education.  Unlike the chiefs who were used for more localized administrative control, 
these new elites were trained as clerks within the central administration.  No one really 
foresaw the coming of independence, but these clerks were the ones who would stand to 
inherit the colonial apparatus.  Literacy skills and competence were important criteria in 
the selection process of these new elites.73 These westernized African did not have ties to 
historical African societies, other than through kinship.  They soon began filling posts 
alongside the Europeans in the civil administration of the regime.  These elites ran into 
the same problem as the European administrators and had to find ways of connecting 
with the village in an attempt to implement their policies. Westernized elites wanted to 
assert their own authority, yet villages held on to their traditional chiefs as the legitimate 
source of authority, albeit some were more legitimate than others.    
A new set of indigenous elites was set to govern through foreign structures 
without effective social control of the village.  Additionally, they tended to repudiate 
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their own history, viewing it as backward and incompatible with their own desires for a 
westernized state.   Challenging their claim to authority were the traditional chiefs who 
were more closely tied to African society and understood the social structures governing 
African society.  There would be many challenges ahead with the village continuing to 
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III. POSTCOLONIAL STATE 
The quest of the postcolonial African administrative apparatus is, like all its 
predecessors, the capture of the village.   Interestingly enough, the new African elites 
immediately adopted the structures and institutions left by the colonial powers.  Africa’s 
new leaders did not foresee the newly independent regimes as anything but within the 
mold of the European nation-state.  Liberation from colonial rule went hand in hand with 
liberation from traditional structures.74 
African leaders were faced with the problem of having to extend power over their 
inherited territories.  They had to do so with an incomplete and highly variable 
administrative system [i.e. presidency, ‘bureaucracy’, military] inherited from the 
colonial powers.75 Colonial administration never successfully established mechanisms 
that actually sought to rule over territories that they claimed belonged to them; they 
lacked the necessary infrastructure to formally control large amounts of land beyond their 
central administration.76   
The essence of the postcolonial history of sub-Saharan Africa is therefore an 
unresolved struggle: westernized elites seeking to extend their control over society, most 
of which is rural, and the village, determined to preserve traditional authority.77  
Postcolonial authority thus attempted to build their new states while initially rejecting 
their own history.  The very same traditional structures they sought to repudiate hindered 
their centralization efforts. 
A. LACK OF CENTRALIZATION 
Just like those that came before it, the post-independence authorities sought to 
effectively centralize their authority.   The new African rulers were thus faced with two 
formidable challenges: 1) to increase the capacity of inherited structures and 2) find ways 
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of connecting with their respective societies.  While the colonial regime had limited 
goals, the postcolonial regime sought to increase its economic viability while 
strengthening their structures of control and building a western styled ‘state.’  African 
elites sought ways of undermining traditional authority and social structures, imposing 
themselves as sole arbiters of policy and force in the process.   
African leaders sought to increase their administrative capacity, centralizing their 
authority in the process.  They first began by attempting to increase the capacity of their 
inherited administration.  African regimes tried to create bureaucratic establishments with 
the necessary power to formulate and implement policy.78  Yet, in creating their 
administrative mechanism, they succeeded mainly in further alienating themselves and 
the societies that they wanted to govern. 
  Congo Brazzaville had a nine-fold increase of public employees between 1960 
and 1972 and the fact that the total salaries of the agricultural staff – forty percent of 
whom are located in the capital city – exceeded the total cash income of the country’s 
6,000,000 peasants is clear evidence of center-society disjuncture.79   This only served to 
further entrench westernized elites within the inherited structures while distancing 
themselves from society.  African leaders were detached enough from society as it was.  
Often western educated and immersed into the colonial structures, they had long 
abandoned their traditional ties to the village, save the family.   
African regimes needed to connect with their societies, or find means of 
penetrating them.  The aim was to establish their administration as the dominant authority 
throughout society.80  Their goal was to move towards a more complete incorporation of 
society using the remnant of colonial governments and authority.  To do so, they had to 
bring local authority under their control so that they could in turn control their 
populations.  One of the biggest impediments to the center’s control was communal land 
ownership. 
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Changes in land tenure remained the most difficult challenge for the central 
administration.  Land, being controlled by local chiefs, renders chiefs the broadest 
political unit with which rural Africa is directly concerned.81  Communal land ownership 
was at the very center of the central administration’s inability to further consolidate its 
authority; thus its corresponding quest to subvert communal property in attempting to 
gain dominance.  This historical process remained a defining factor of African society.  
The land tenure system underscored the position and authority of the chief.82  This 
prevented the center from effectively controlling the population. 
B. COMMUNAL LAND OWNERSHIP 
Realizing that communal land tenure limited the capacity of the regime, the 
administrative apparatus sought to carry out land reforms.83 These were ostensibly done 
for economic reforms, but it was actually an attempt on the part of the administrative 
apparatus to assert its control over the chief, thus the village.  There were variations on 
the theme, but most did not get very far. 
Zairian authorities passed a land law in 1973 whose stated purpose was to 
institutionalize the appropriation of private property.84  This was more of an attempt to 
control the village.  The law sought to replace the village chief as the arbiter of land by 
the central administration.  In other words, the regime attempted to grant all or part of the 
territory of the village to an individual of its choosing.85  In doing so, it hoped to supplant 
the authority of the chief and increase the centralization of its authority.  Nevertheless, 
the policy failed.  Others took a radically different approach in a similar attempt of 
subverting traditional authority. 
Tanzania had one of the more imaginative means of attempting to control the 
villages.  The administration of Tanzania claimed the existence of a food crisis in 1974-
1975.  In so doing, it announced its policy of Ujamaa, compelling farmers to abandon 
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their historical land and move into administrative villages.86  It, on a small scale, was 
trying to usurp historical authority by forcibly moving people into villages under central 
control.  By taking people out of their traditional social environment, the belief was that 
they would be more open to change.87  In the end, the Ujamaa scheme failed largely due 
to peasant indifference and administrative inability to successfully engage them.88  There 
were other attempts at subverting traditional sources of authority.  Regardless of the 
variation on this attempted means of usurping traditional authority, the postcolonial 
administrations remained largely unable in controlling society, and the villages 
successfully retained their rights to land:  their connection to the land persisted.89  
Kenya was one of the few regimes that successfully eroded some of the traditional 
connection to land.  Through a settlement transfer scheme, they created a new 
landowning class amongst indigenous elites and with the land registration program, they 
were able to have a process in which land could be transferred from one person to 
another.90  With these processes, the central regime managed, with the help of the British 
colonial power, to create an African landowning class and a landless workforce.  Both 
schemes managed to increase the incorporation of society into the new regime. 
The process of settlement was carried out before the end of colonization.  It was 
carried out in such a way that society would have to uphold the sanctity of private 
ownership.91  In doing so, it also created a new stratum of larger peasant landowning 
producers, more tied into and dependent on the administration for their newfound wealth. 
This process complemented that of land registration.  Although many peasants became 
landless, some had sold their plots to neighboring ones rich enough to buy them.  The 
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land registration scheme allowed some to enlarge their holdings, thus creating a type of 
Kenyan ‘Kulak.’92   
These two schemes combined allowed a new ‘structure’ to rise from the rural 
area, one heavily tied to the central regime.  A the top were very large-scale individual 
landowners, some with several hundred acres, all linked professionally, socially, and 
economically to the colonial and, consequently, post-colonial regime.93 At the bottom 
was a growing number of landless laborers and small peasant freeholders with little 
access to the regime.  Unlike many other regimes in Africa, Kenya was one in which the 
center was able to increase its capacity at the expense of the village.  
African elites, through the administrative structures they inherited from colonial 
powers, sought to expand their penetration and control of society.  Yet, these attempts at 
incorporation proved to be minimal and the center has failed to effectively penetrate 
society.94  This complicated their efforts to generate revenue.  Regimes were always 
heavily dependent on indirect taxation, especially on commodity taxes.95 The ratio of 
revenue from commodity exports to GDP rose from 24 percent in 1966 to 35 percent in 
1982; as much as 60 percent of the tax increase during that same period can be attributed 
to the total yield from commodity taxation.96  African regimes never successfully 
changed their revenue base, remaining heavily dependent on commodity export tax.  This 
meant a heavy reliance on the village for survival. 
African administrators sought to extract resources to meet the revenue imperative 
but had limited success in taxing the villages’ export commodities.  They were never able 
to transform their material base, and their reach rarely extended to the point of 
production, the village.97  They attempted to draw from a largely agricultural population 
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a reliable income sufficient to support the regime’s expenditure needs.98  African regimes 
sought to channel the resources of the village into their administration.   
Central authorities required resources to appease the urban populations. African 
elites equated the survival of the regime with appeasement of urban population – a small 
portion of African society – via subsidies even if the much larger, and poorer, rural 
populations had to be taxed.99  This is important as the village had resources central 
authority deemed necessary for survival, while the village could survive, albeit on a 
subsistence level, without the regimes.  The peasants themselves were unconcerned with 
the need for a surplus, remaining subsistence based.100  Some African regimes developed 
a strategy of revenue extraction involving marketing boards. 
Marketing boards were used because agriculture represents the principal 
economic activity in most of Africa and can generate the most foreign exchange.101  They 
were inherited colonial structures.  These agencies controlled the market for agricultural 
export and were often the greatest source of revenue for the central administration.  These 
proved to be an effective source of replenishing administrative coffers; effectively taxing 
the village.  There was a catch; in order to have goods to tax [i.e. coffee, cocoa and other 
primary goods] and generate this revenue and associated benefits, the regime depended 
on the African villages to produce.   
African regimes, using the inherited government and administrative structures, 
sought to nationalize, monopolize, control currency and whatever else they could imagine 
in an attempt to effectively extract from the population.102  Senegal attempted to 
nationalize the peanut trade; Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia and others used marketing 
boards; Guinea-Bissau attempted to create monopolistic stores controlled by the central 
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apparatus aiming to channel the sales of peasant surplus.   Nonetheless, success has been 
limited. 
Even though regimes have been able to control parts of rural trade and extract 
some revenue from it, in virtually all countries unofficial or parallel markets have 
expanded alongside.103  This involved the barter and exchange of goods outside the 
regime’s effective control.  By 1970, as much as ninety percent of surplus crops and 
artisan goods were believed to have been induced into the parallel market in response to 
low official prices and poor terms of trade with the central administration because of its 
inability to effectively monitor, much less monopolize the village activities.104   
While African regimes have been able to appropriate some surplus, the 
fragmentation of social control greatly restricted the growth of African regimes after 
independence.105   Postcolonial regime attempts at centralizing their authority did not go 
very far.  This could be because while it sought greater centralization and capacity for 
policy implementation, its only connection with society was through the historical means 
of patron-client relationships.  As such, regime longevity had less to do with its policy 
implementation ability than its ability to connect with the periphery. 
C. PATRON-CLIENT SYSTEMS 
The historical means in which the center sought to accommodate the varied 
interests of the village and control society was through patron-client relationships.  
Westernized elites fell back on this tried and true means in an attempt to effectively 
govern society.  This system of brokers and mediators continuously interceded between 
society and central authority.106   
Historically, centralized authority was never completely dependent on the village 
for its survival.  The control of the village was hard and political control could never be 
taken for granted given that the environment made it so difficult to continually exert 
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authority over significant distances.107   African regimes relied primarily on trade to 
generate the necessary revenue to support their functions.  As such, the village was able 
to set the tone of the patron-client relationship.    
These political exchanges between centralized elites and the villages were an 
administrative necessity; sub-Saharan regimes had little alternative but to enter into 
political exchange with the periphery.108 This is due to its discussed inability to impose 
itself on society.  Without these political exchanges, the center would become entirely 
irrelevant.  In effect, those who control the central administration did not control society.  
As such, they had to find ways to connect with the village in an effort to gain minimal 
control and retain some relevance. 
Centralized elites thus compensated for their inability to effectively control 
society by entering political exchanges with traditional authority.  Though tough tactics 
might have been appealing to Obote109 in dealing with the Buganda, he lacked the 
military capacity to control society.110  He thus resorted to dealing with the village 
ambassadors who each jockeyed for their own interest.111  He was by no means the 
exception to the rule.  Bargaining skills became a necessity of African regimes because of 
their inability to impose terms over semi-autonomous peripheral authority.112  
The relationship between patron and clients is in its ideal form based on mutual 
trust and deference.113 Just as services are expected from the client, so are obligations on 
the part of the patron.  These relationships involve a multitude of actors. “When 
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exchanges operate among equal or near equals chances are that trust and self-interest will 
combine to reinforce each other and pave the way for mutually rewarding forms of 
exchange; threats of ‘negative’ exchange, on the other hand, are never more real than in 
situations of sharp and persistent inequalities.”114  In the postcolonial regime, patron-
client networks are heavily reliant on the village for the extraction of resources; this gave 
the relationship a distributive aspect.   
In modern Africa, these relationships are most clearly expressed through the 
electoral process.  In Kenya, parliamentary MPs had to reach out to the periphery.  MPs 
needed to devote far greater time in their local community to ensure they were not voted 
out of office.115  Legislators acted as representatives of their villages exclusively, in fact 
becoming modern patrons.  As such, their constituency expected them to represent the 
interests of the village to the center.   The MP is thus viewed not only as a representative 
of the administration but also as village patron capable of extracting resources for the 
local community.  These MPs would promise to spend extensively in their villages, to 
include clinics, schools, wells and whatever other primarily social needs the village might 
demand.  The crucial factor for the village was the MP’s ability to provide available 
resources.  Without resources to provide to the village, the MP lost significance and the 
connection between the center and its periphery was severed.  Either the MP kept his 
position and the connection remained severed, or the village voted in another MP more 
capable of extracting resources from the center and the connection resumed; either way, 
the connection was made based on the village’s decision, not that of the center.     
As such, the revenue collected from the village is re-distributed to the village in 
one form or another.  The patron-client networks lead to an economy of social-welfare.  
One example is Nigeria, in which a patron gained access to the regime by promising to 
spend heavily on health and education if elected by the villages.116  This is an example of 
the economy of affection; one that takes into account the expensive patronage practices in 
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Africa due to the clients controlling and driving the process.117  This type of 
redistributive aspect is not new; rather it is a continuation of pre-colonial times.   
Additionally, patron-client relationships are integrated into hegemonic exchanges.  
These exchanges relied on reciprocity and the “rhythm of ethnic political interchanges, 
along the lines of established patron-client networks.”118  The village still drove the 
process, but those on top could not effectively connect with all segments and the 
multitude of actors that comprised such patron-client networks.  Another layer thus had to 
be added to connect all segments and actors. 
This layer is known as a hegemonic exchange.  Hegemonic exchanges are a form 
of regime-facilitated coordination in which a somewhat autonomous central regime and 
structures and a number of other interests, engage based on commonly accepted 
understandings in a process of mutual accommodation.119  This exchange is one of 
necessity.  Without it, managing the various segments of society would be a near 
impossibility as all have different interest.  Without mutual accommodation, the regime 
would not survive.  Hegemonic exchanges complicate regime decision-making ability as 
the center must coordinate all policy through the various other segments before it can 
proceed.  To connect with their entire society, African regimes needed to connect with 
patrons from each segment. 
In light of the scarcity prone conditions of Africa, neither hegemonic control nor 
direct political exchange accurately describes regime dynamics.120  African regimes, 
often under the control of the Presidency, thus used a semi-codified set of procedures to 
manage their networks.  These networks were an additional layer within the patron-client 
relationships.  It was part of the ongoing stream of these informal regime-societal 
exchanges that determine stable and effective inter-group relations.121  It must be 
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remembered that as much as the office of the President wanted to control society, it could 
only survive by maintaining its connection with the village on which it was dependent for 
political support.  This connection was maintained through endless layers of patron-client 
systems brought together at the top through hegemonic exchange.  This exchange is not a 
new phenomenon.  Historically, African leaders have relied on top-level layers to 
effectively manage their patron-client systems. 
The Mogho Naba of the Mossi relied on a ‘hegemonic exchange’ to govern his 
country.122  He included Ministers of various groups and social status in his 
administration.  The Ninissi, a small segment of society, could always count on filling the 
post of the Minister of Religion.  The Mogho Naba even had a ‘slave’ as his Minister of 
Defense.  The Mogho Naba thus ensured proportional representation as his own survival 
and retention of power was at stake.  Thus, modern leaders simply borrowed traditional 
means of management in an attempt to keep the various segments of their networks 
engaged and prevent defections that would otherwise weaken their position. 
Westernized elites, like their predecessor the Mogho Naba, had difficulty in 
effectively controlling their society. Consequently, they had to insure that all segments 
were represented in the patron-client relationships to ensure their own survival.  
Dependence on the village drove them to this proportional representation as failure to 
receive the tacit approval of any one segment could effectively bring down central 
authority.  Again, just like historical African societies, the result was a very low level of 
centralization of authority. 
D. PATTERNS OF INCORPORATION AND DISENGAGEMENT   
The rhythm of African society thus varies from incorporation to disengagement.  
African regimes have not been significant actors in the everyday life of the village.  As 
the central regime sought to centralize and increase its capacity, society either can be 
incorporated or attempt to disengage.  Initially, the village engaged the center at 
independence given the euphoria of the moment and various promises made by 
westernized elites.  With time, the village began to disengage realizing that the center 
offered less and less while asking for more than the village was willing to provide.  Had 
unit of production and a necessity for the center to survive, the village not been the basic                                                  
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disengagement might not have been an option, but as things stood, the village could walk 
away from the center. 
It is generally accepted that a regime would seek to incorporate its society as it 
strengthened centralized control and increased its extraction ability.  However, greater 
incorporation could have increased the burden of the regime and may have caused an 
overextension of its already limited capacity, as far as the input of incorporated groups 
did not always match the resources allocated to them.123  The scarcity of resources was 
often such that what the village brought to the center did not offset the maintenance costs 
in the form of new clinics, wells or schools.  As much as the center might have wanted to 
incorporate the village through the patron-client system, it could not effectively maintain 
such relationships.  Nevertheless, more often than not the center wanted to engage and 
incorporate the village. 
Given the scarcity of resources, the regime might seek to counter disengagement 
by attempting to further exert its already limited capacity to control; send out the military 
to oversee village moves [i.e. Ujamaa], threaten local authority with sanctions should 
their village fail to produce and so on.  However, these attempts to prevent 
disengagement did not reduce it so much as push it to more extreme forms.124  If 
withdrawal is illegal, villages might simply choose to ignore or by-pass the laws; and if 
that fails, they might fall back to the historical practice of leaving the land and 
migrating125, or more seriously rebel or form a separatist movement [i.e. Biafran 
Republic in Nigeria.]   
African patterns of incorporation and disengagement show that the regime is not a 
monolith.  African regimes, thanks largely to the colonial legacy, are the main actors that 
interact with society; they are a repository of tremendous resources obtained from 
international sources in the form of foreign aid, investment of foreign capital, 
                                                 
123 Azarya, Victor, Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement, p. 15, in 
Rothchild, Donald, Chazan, Naomi (eds), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Westview 
Press, 1988. 
124 Ibid, p. 16. 
125 History shows that villagers would, if sufficiently motivate, desert the village and move elsewhere 
or under the authority of another chief. 
40 
international loans and political military resources.126  Disengagement is not a passive 
activity; it is a choice.  Consequently, villages held on to historical structures with 
tenacity and responded to, though not necessarily in accordance with, regime actions.127 
So far, it seems that the center’s dependency on commodity export alongside with 
village self-sufficiency has led to greater disengagement than incorporation.  For greater 
incorporation to occur, African regimes must first find means of becoming self-sufficient. 
This would in turn allow them to increase their capacity to implement policy and render 
the center more attractive to the village.   
E. WEAKENING OF THE REGIME 
The postcolonial regime lost its battle with the village.  Social structures were 
such that they favored the village in its interaction with the center.  To continue funding 
its efforts to supplant the village, the center needed to generate revenue.  In this case, 
revenue was reliant on the increased production of commodity exports, which the village 
controlled.  The center’s low revenue did not allow it to provided the needed social 
services demanded by the village.  Consequently, the village disengaged from its 
relationship with the center.   
 With decreased revenues, central authority increasingly lost relevance to the 
village.  Without resources to provide, they were not attractive as patron; the relationship 
was no longer mutually rewarding, as the village could not get obligations in return for 
their services.  The center atrophied to such a point that western scholars began to refer to 
it as weak and vacuous, unable to meet the Weberian definition.128  Of course, the center 
was never a state to begin with, but now it cannot even maintain its façade as 1) it no 
longer receives the necessary influx of resources to keep the village engaged, and thus 2) 
loses all ability to interface with the village and whatever little control it had over 
production.   In the end, society found centralized regimes not particularly useful, and at 
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times even threatening of their historical rights.  As such, it ended its incorporation, 
however informal, and disengaged more and more from the center. 
As the center could no longer turn towards the village and attempts to effectively 
incorporate it proved too difficult, it focused its attention elsewhere.  This is what 
happened in areas rich in natural mineral resources, especially diamonds: allowing central 
authority to use the administrative apparatus for private, versus collective interest.129  A 
good example of such a regime would be Liberia.  It is a regime that the village can no 
longer control through traditional and historical means: patron-client relationships.   
This regime becomes that of the warlord.130  It is one in which the westernized 
elites cease all efforts to incorporate African society.  These regimes not only lost all 
connection with the village, unlike the others, they do not need the village.  Elites in a 
warlord regime control markets to enhance their power.  Control over commerce, rather 
than people, becomes the key demarcator of political power.131  In this aspect, warlord 
regimes closely resemble historical societies, but unlike their historical predecessors, they 
are disconnected from the societies in which they operate.  In addition, modern warlords 
are not warlords in the true sense of the word.  Their focus was to control the mineral 
trade; as such, they are not interested in territorial expansion.  Those without minerals to 
trade are not warlords at all, they are simply desperately holding on to whatever vestiges 
of power and authority remaining in their particular area, but lacking the ability to 
generate revenue through mineral trade, their continued survival is unlikely. 
Of note, historical societies did not have many warlords.  The center maintained 
its connection with the village and never achieved the levels of financial independence of 
modern day warlord regimes.  Again, some old is mixed with some new.  In this respect, 
Achille Mbembe is correct in stating that there are continuities between pre- and post-
colonial Africa in the exercise of power, the resort to violence, and the nature of political 
authority.132 
                                                 
129 Reno, William, Warlord Politics and the African States, pp. 2-3, Lynne Rienner, 1998 
130 For detailed information, read ibid. 
131 Ibid, p. 71. 
132 Cited in Richard, Joseph, The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa, p. 58, 
in Joseph, Richard (ed), State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, Lynne Rienner, 1999. 
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Individuals such as Doe and Taylor, using their private armies, managed to gain 
control over natural resources, leaving the villages to fend for themselves.  The village 
was completely cut off from the elites and lost all meaning in the elite calculation of 
power.  This is an extreme disassociation of the center from society, from which there 
might not be any coming back until the depletion of natural resources.  Sadly, this is but 
the outcome of a long experiment began with colonialization to westernize Africa while 
denying her own historicity and achievements.133 
With the exception of such warlord regimes, African regimes continue to seek 
means of controlling people.  Land, remaining a communal asset, is not up for grabs.  As 
such, modern regimes must find ways of bringing value to the village in order to gain 
some control over its production. The most effective means of doing so is that of patron-
client networks.  However, for these networks to survive, resources are needed.  As of 
now, the village is able to live through subsistence farming and the elites have yet to offer 
enough incentive for them to abdicate some of their autonomy and to incorporate 
themselves within a larger social framework.  The incentives in question are primarily 
social goods such as education and clinics.  The villages need to get something in return 
for their incorporation and engagement with the center.  For the village to provide 
necessary revenue to the center, it is important that the center provide basic and necessary 
services to the village. 
Africa has a history of societal structures of participation and accountability, yet 
those of the past [i.e. The Asantemanhyiamu134 of the Asantehene] belong to a time that 
is gone.135  History can serve as a guide that would allow modern regimes to stabilize and 
successfully incorporate itself into African society.  The new elites might not be able to 
bring back the past, but they can create a new future.  The incentive was lacking as 
resources managed to flow in through their central structures, but as the village continues 
                                                 
133 Davidson, Basil, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, p. 245, Three 
Rivers Press, 1992 
134 The Asantehene ruled along side the Asantemanhyiamu (National Assembly) and was advised by a 
“Council of Four.”  The Asantemanhyiamu was comprised of district rulers and Kumase chiefs. 
135 Davidson, Basil, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State, p 314, Three 
Rivers Press, 1992. 
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to disengage from them, their continued survival will depend on their ability to re-
connect. 
In looking at the future, African regimes should take into account their own 
historical record: one that favors strong decentralization, communal land ownership and 
primacy of the village.  Past regimes – that of the Mogho Naba of the Mossi or the 
Kabaka of the Baganda – succeeded while realizing their own limits on attempts for 
greater centralization.  African leaders in the future will be forced to accept the limits of 
their power inherent in African history and structures if they are to survive. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The European experience is not the African one.  State developmental theories, 
assumed universally applicable, have failed to adequately account for the African 
experience, yet this has more to do with application rather than actual theory.  In Africa,  
the interaction between the center and the periphery has differed significantly from that 
of Europe.  Centralization of authority has always been an African challenge from the 
precolonial period, through the short but brutal time of colonialism, to the independence 
of African regimes.   
A. STATE FORMATION IN AFRICA 
State formation in Africa followed a drastically different path than that of the 
European experience.  Three aspects in particular merit further consideration and 
discussion: 1) the lack of chronic war, 2) leaders being primarily traders, not warlords 
and 3) African leaders inability to effectively control the peasant.  These are over-arching 
themes that are a result of the three commonalities discussed throughout this thesis, and 
provide a stark contrast to state development in Europe. 
Weber observes that the chronic state of war was an important condition for the 
rise of the charismatic warlord.  Further readings suggest that war in fact led Europe to 
centralize its authority structures in order to survive.  Countless polities disappeared in 
the process, not having effectively competed in this rather brutal contest.  The cause of 
war is up for debate, be it population density, man’s natural greed or some other factor, 
but the end result is that war demands efficiency; be it in extracting revenue or 
administration. 
Africa never experienced a chronic state of war.  This could be for a variety of 
reasons.  The subsistence economy did not allow for much extra-curricular activity: were 
individuals to leave the land for an extended period, famine would likely occur.  Poor soil 
conditions, weather or rudimentary technology might have contributed, but the result was 
the same, individuals spent most of their time tending to their farms.  Of course, 
strongmen would not generally care about a famine lest it affect them.  Within the 
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African context, a famine would affect the strongman as most of his power came from the 
people.   
Contributing to this lack of war could be the difficulty in raising a standing army.  
Again, a subsistence economy had to play a role, but other factors come in.  Africa did 
not have landlords who could effectively raise an army while keeping others to tend to 
the fields.  African leaders had difficulty maintaining armies for any extended period.  
Raiding parties were common, but lengthy planned military campaigns rare.  The 
inability of potential competitors to raise an army alleviated the threat to a polity’s 
survival. This is evidenced by the fact that hundreds of polities continued to exist in 
Africa.  Whereas some disappeared due to unrecorded reasons, the historical record 
shows that even in spite of numerous contractions and expansions of prominent polities, 
numerous ones remained.  They managed to maintain their cohesion in spite of perceived 
control by another.  The center’s hold on the periphery has always been tenuous at best, 
and as long as the ‘conquered’ polity paid an occasional tribute, it was left intact. 
Along with war being the exception rather than the rule was the fact that most 
African leaders were primarily traders, not warlords.  Again, the inability to control the 
land might have resulted in this phenomenon, but the implications remain.  As traders, 
African entrepreneurs would be less interested in the accumulation of land than the 
maintenance of stability at minimal cost in order to ensure undisrupted trade.    
Historically, war harms trade networks.  Since African leaders were heavily dependent on 
trade for revenue, it is unlikely that they would engage in activity that would stifle their 
income.   
War can benefit trade by expanding territory, thus controlling larger trading 
networks.  However, in Africa, controlling trade usually meant one of two things: 1) 
being able to tax caravans traveling through one’s territory or 2) controlling the actual 
source of the goods.  The first suggests that the size of the territory quickly becomes 
irrelevant.  Caravans were usually taxed once upon entering the territory and secondly if 
they stopped at a market.  This would suggest that aggrandizing one’s territory did not 
generate the necessary revenue required to maintain the increased costs.   
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African traders controlled the actual source of trade.  Some, such as the Empire of 
Mali and Ghana, controlled the salt mines.  These mines were fairly localized and not 
dispersed through great geographical areas in Africa.  As such, increasing territory would 
rarely bring in additional mines and surely generate increased maintenance costs.  The 
trader sought to keep costs at a minimum and given the African trading context, 
increasing one’s territory, or going to war, rarely justified the associated costs. 
The inattention to land ownership also made borders and land demarcation a 
foreign concept within the African context.  The trader would not be as concerned as to 
where his borders began and ended as controlling the people was a rather complicated 
task.  Patron-client systems were inefficient and required what appear to be significant 
resources given the scarcity in the sub-Saharan region.  As a result, the trader would 
content himself on occasionally making his presence felt by sending a raiding party to a 
village from time to time.   
It must be remembered that the same scarcity affecting the trader affected the 
village.  Thus, the village did not have much to give up in the first place.  Were the 
central authority to raid the nest too often, there was a real possibility that it would 
simply cease to exist.  As long as he could exact occasional tribute and control the 
necessary centers of gravity of trade, land did not enter the equation. This would once 
again reinforce the lack of a chronic state of war on the continent.   
Tied with the fact that African elites were primarily traders and that war was an 
uncommon occurrence is the fact that the elites never truly controlled their peasant 
population.  European warlords could coerce their population and separate them from the 
land to conduct their campaigns.  This was never an option in Africa.  African strongmen 
had to accept rather stringent limitation on their power to control men.  The control of 
land was never an option, rather, African leaders had to maintain control with patron-
client systems.  These were far more delicate as clients are much harder to force and 
coerce.   
African entrepreneurs could not pull their population away from the land without 
fear of various societal disruptions.  Again, scarcity and low yield agriculture come into 
the equation.  Should the peasants leave their land for any extended period, the 
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community as a whole would not have enough food to support itself.  The harvest and 
planting season was off-limits in terms of diverging the productive capacity of the 
peasantry away from the land.  This would severely hinder the center effort to work on 
projects that could facilitate its ability to administer the territory.   
Weber, Wilks and Herbst all point to the importance of roads as an essential 
feature of the center’s ability to project power.  Roads took a lot of time and manpower 
given the distances, technological limitations and simple engineering requirements.  
Given the necessity of tending to the plots of land for survival, the center could face 
severe famine or social unrest in its quest for consolidation.  The threat was larger than 
the perceived benefits for only the Asante seemed to have undertaken such a laborious 
task.    
To add to the center’s problems was the simple fact that African peasants were 
not a captured lot.  Should conditions prove too adverse, they could leave and find a more 
suitable location.  The historical record suggests that villages would leave and migrate to 
a different location should local conditions overwhelm its limited production capacity.  If 
the choice is between road building and survival, survival will likely win out.  In sum, all 
of the African conditions lead to a rather poor context in which to consolidate centralized 
authority.   
Allowing for different historical contexts and variations in political structures, 
African developmental strategies remained strikingly similar throughout the precolonial, 
colonial and postcolonial timeframes.  Throughout history, a central authority has found 
itself dealing with a periphery of which the control has been a constant challenge.  The 
most important discontinuity has been the foreign structures imported through 
colonialization. 
Precolonial African regimes began developing from the very foundations of 
African society.  They built their power from the ground up while confronting the limits 
of centralization imposed by the historical commonalities.  As such, their rule was woven 
with existing social structures and the informal rules governing society.  Their capacity 
was limited, thus they only grew and extended as far as it allowed them to.  
Consequently, few African polities expanded for significantly long periods. 
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Post-colonial regimes, on the other hand, took over the remnants of the colonial 
structures and were without roots in the society they aimed to govern.  Colonial structures 
and institutions remained in the background of the every day life in the village.  The 
village saw signs of the regime, such as a control point, or local court, but did not interact 
with it unless absolutely necessary or otherwise forced to.  The structures had little 
relevance in its daily life. Initially, the promises that came with independence enticed 
African societies to interact with the center, on their own terms.  Yet, it was clear that the 
center did not have the capacity to properly manage those few projects in which they got 
involved [i.e. marketing boards].   
Additionally, the center could be rather threatening with their use of foreign 
structures.  African regimes would use the army to force itself upon society, but could 
only do so for limited amounts of time: the result was often brutal.  Central authority was 
arbitrary.  The rules of the games at the center were in a constant state of flux.  African 
societies soon began disengaging with a center.   
This societal disengagement further weakened an already anemic center.  The 
center needed the periphery for its continued survival.  Without it, the center would lose 
relevance.  Yet, the center’s inability to solidify and institutionalize its structures and 
rules of the game, alongside its poor capacity to develop and implement policy, made it 
an unappealing partner to its clients.  As such, clients began withdrawing from their 
relationship with the center, taking along whatever limited resources they had in the first 
place. 
As such, the center became desperate to reconnect with the periphery in hopes of 
maintaining whatever little power they could.  Society, then with the upper hand, could 
re-engage on its own terms through informal channels, effectively ‘controlling’ the 
center.  In some worst-case scenarios, the periphery never re-engaged and the center 
remains due to an abundance of natural resources it could easily control without having to 
engage society. 
Regardless, state development in Africa remains strikingly similar throughout its 
history.  It is a struggle between the center and the periphery in which the center is 
hindered by three commonalities: lack of centralization, communal land ownership and 
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patron-client systems.  These commonalities worked against centralization, each building 
on the other and helping the periphery maintain a degree of independence rarely seen in 
other regions of the world.  
B. STATE FORMATION IN PERSPECTIVE 
The analysis of state formation in Africa highlights some important contrasts with 
the European model.  There is no need to suggest that Africa has a unique set of variables 
such as ethnicity or tribal affiliation required in understanding her developmental process.  
Differences in land tenure would affect all regions equally.  In the case of Africa and 
Europe, it is a difference of diffused land control versus concentrated land control.  As 
such, land tenure is an independent variable that affects the dependent variable of state 
development. 
Land tenure is a common variable in analyzing both the European and African 
experience.  It plays an important role in both regions, but with entirely different results.   
Private landownership in Europe meant that individuals could control others by granting 
or withholding access to the land.  This in turn allowed individuals to accumulate greater 
wealth and power based on specific control of the land.  These individuals represented a 
small percentage of the population, but became very powerful.  Controlling land was 
synonymous with power, thus individuals sought to increase their landholding, coming 
into conflict with others based on demarcation.  This emphasis on landownership seems 
to have generated a propensity for warfare, leading to a centralized apparatus that could 
best defend the interest of those few individual landowners at the expense, for the most 
part, of the general population.  Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that although 
landowners did collaborate with the center, the center did constrain their actions and 
Europe experienced a great power struggle between the center and the landlords in which 
the center eventually prevailed.  
African communal landownership made it impossible for a group of individual 
landowners to emerge.  Instead, the political entrepreneur seeking power had to find ways 
of influencing men and controlling men.  Whereas the control of land is a one-sided 
endeavor, a person controls land and the land requires nothing in return, as well as 
profitable, in the sense that one can extract from the land at a profit, the control of people 
results in another process altogether.  People must have reason to align themselves with 
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another.  Why should one give up individual rights to another if the other cannot force 
subjugation and offers nothing in return?  African strongmen required resources to begin 
controlling people and extracting resources in the first place: perhaps explaining why 
controlling trade was so crucial.  Trade revenue allowed the accumulation necessary to 
begin the process of controlling people.  These dependence-based relationships 
complicated the process quite a bit.  
Different values of the same independent variable, that of land tenure, resulted in 
a different value of the dependent variable, that of state development.  Each value of the 
independent variable would have the same effect on either region.  Of note, concentrated 
landownership does not necessarily mean private landownership.  Concentrated 
landownership led to private ownership within the European context, but the analysts 
should not limit the possibilities based on one particular outcome.  Nevertheless, the 
European experience is important in that it allows the analyst to compare and contrast 
how differences in the value of an independent variable can lead to different values of the 
dependent variable.  With this example, it is easy conclude that the universal theory of 
state formation, as discussed by Weber, Tilly and others, is relevant and appropriate when 
properly applied. 
Finally, this thesis shows the importance of historicity in any study.  To simply 
assume that a region lacks history or that history is irrelevant leads to poor analysis and 
fails to discover the continuity of processes.  Weber took great care in studying history 
while analyzing the European experience and developing the European state model.  
There is no reason why history can simply be ignored in other regions of the world.  It is 
naïve to assume that history around the world only begins with the arrival of Europeans 
and their structures.  World history is far too rich for Europe to be at its center.  Even 
though African regimes must deal with rootless European institutions, the historical 
commonalities drive the developmental process in Africa.   
C. STATE BUILDING IN AFRICA 
State building in Africa is and has always been a challenge.  Using the model as 
sketched by Max Weber, this thesis tries in turn to draw a sketch of the state development 
process in Africa.  This is but a brief look into what was assuredly a long and complex 
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process deserving more attention than the few following paragraphs.  As with Europe, it 
begins with the accumulation of power. 
African chiefs were not similar to the European charismatic leader.  As such, it is 
unlikely that the African chief would become the same type of king into which the 
European charismatic leader evolved.  The authority of the African chiefs depended on 
their standing within society.  This was based on multiple criteria: popularity, group 
affiliation, and overall competence.  Their access to power started with a dependence on 
society, not their ability to meet external threats and undertake war.   
The existence of the African chief differed markedly from his European 
counterparts as his existence did depend on others and not solely upon a chronic state of 
war.  As such, African leaders had to find ways to appease or satisfy those upon whom 
their position depended upon, leading to patron-client systems.  Contrary to the European 
experience, these structures placed the interests of the system with the ruled, not the ruler.  
As such, power was much more decentralized, the most extreme form of decentralization 
occurring with such societies as the Tivs or Ibos.  On the other side of the spectrum, 
certain societies produced Kings.  These Kings were little more than the chief of chiefs.  
As such, the African King’s power was more constrained than that of his European 
counterpart as its source was ultimately society itself.   
These structures, such as they were, complicated the accumulation of already 
scant resources.  Further complicating the calculation of African leaders was the need for 
resources to set up patron-client systems in the first place.  Their primary occupation thus 
seems to have been finding means of taxing commerce at its choke points, the markets 
and source of goods.  This required a minimal amount of force and allowed the leaders to 
generate limited revenue to set up dependence based relationships that would in turn free 
them from the land as much as possible given the subsistence basis of African societies.   
This process led to a different ending than the European experience.  The result in 
Europe was an evolution of a political-territorial association that sought to monopolize 
violence.  The African result was a weak center fighting to maintain its detachment from 
society but heavily dependent on those it sought to control.  This led to very decentralized 
authority structures that emphasized servicing or maintenance of the population in return 
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for recognition of rule or status as ‘Big Man.’  The ultimate ‘Big Man’ being an African 
King such as the Asantehene or Mogho Naba. 
The processes of power accumulation and regime building occurred in both 
African and Europe.  It is simply that each region had different values of the same 
variable to work with.  It is not that the European peasant wanted to give autonomy to the 
center; it is simply that the structures that emerged from the base favored the center.  In 
Africa, the social structures favored the periphery.  These processes, with all their 
limitation and constraints, continue today. 
D. DOMESTIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Modern African leaders continue in the pursuit of the accumulation of power.  
Yet, today, their main instruments are imported from the European experience, ones that 
have little relevance to their society given the African context.  Nevertheless, weak 
central control is nothing new to Africa as the center has always managed to survive with 
limited resources.  In the past, the center had emerged with the support of society, while 
modern African regimes were imposed upon society by exogenous powers.  Today, 
societal disengagement has left the center even fewer resources than it had to begin with.  
This means that the center’s attempt to manage patron-client systems is weakening as it is 
increasingly unable to provide the social services clients require to remain engage in the 
first place. 
The limitations of African society and its accompanying structures have overcome 
the center’s efforts towards regime strengthening and consolidation.  As such, new 
strategies are needed in attempts to overcome structural limitations.  In the worst-case 
scenario, central authority is content on controlling mineral resources and selling them to 
the international community while forgoing all attempts to reconnect with society.  In 
these cases, their power is no longer rooted in society, but in their ability to control 
limited areas and sell to the international community.  As such, they are outward looking 
regimes.  In other cases, central authority continues to promote the current societal 
disorder as a last ditch effort to retain limited power, realizing that reconnecting power to 
its traditional roots would diminish their own power or push them aside completely.  In 
many cases, they use the military to protect their remaining personal power, funding it at 
the expense of everything else. 
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A few African leaders, well aware of their own limitations, as are most, are trying 
to build decentralized and flexible structures in the hope of accommodating society and 
re-engaging it.  The more a leader tries to monopolize authority, the more the leader loses 
control of society.  One example of such a leader is Alpha Konaré of Mali.  He is 
attempting to build structures appropriate to the African context.   
Konaré is giving back an amount of control to the different regions; he has 
increased his own ability to influence events while enhancing the capacity of his central 
administration.  Realizing the limitations of his administrative apparatus, he does not 
seem to be trying to make it do more than it can handle, preferring to do what it can well.  
One perfect example is Konaré’s support of Kafo Jiginew, a union of cotton-growers.  He 
allowed them to form a credit union and to build schools and clinics.  Eventually, these 
initiatives will benefit the central administration by promoting economic growth and an 
educated and healthy workforce at no expense to the administration.  This bodes well for 
such a poor administration.  Only time will tell whether Konaré succeeded in 
reconnecting and consolidating his regime.  It could very well be that true success would 
mean that these decentralized structures would become the true authority and the center 
would cease to have all meaning whatsoever. 
Scarcity is a fact most regimes must deal with.  The resources to draw upon are 
limited.  This imposes certain restrictions on the center as limited resources tend to 
translate into limited means.  Thus, the center must focus its limited resources on those 
aspects it considers most crucial.  Just like their historical predecessors, modern regimes 
are much more dependent on the support of society than their western counterparts.   
True, most modern regimes continue to function, albeit minimally, without the 
support of the societies in which they operate.  Yet, should they ever want to take root, to 
gain capacity and relevance and to increase their power, they must reconnect with 
society.  Society is, within the African context, the true arbiter of power.  As such, they 
should find ways of gaining relevance within the eyes of society in order for them to be 
recognized as legitimate by those they depend upon to stay in power in the first place.  
Many modern leaders such as Mugabe and Éyadéma are ignoring this and finding their 
hold on society to be increasingly tenuous.  Again, the more the center seeks to control, 
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the less they in fact control as society simply disengages and they lose relevance in the 
eyes of all but themselves and a few interested individuals.   
E. INTERNATIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The costs of intervention in Africa are enormous.  The most cost effective way for 
the western power to deal with Africa is by allowing its internal struggles to work 
themselves out.  Problems in Africa are a result of domestic social structural conditions.  
As such, the best means for African to sort itself out is to let the processes take place 
without external factors. The international community can be most effective by not 
intervening in Africa.  A few things would help ensure the results of the internal power 
struggles are sustainable and stabilizing.   
The first thing outside agents should consider is dropping the debt burden while 
simultaneously ending all foreign aid.  African regimes took loans to pay off interest on 
previous loans and have no realistic means to pay off their debt.  The little money they 
have could be better spent dealing with pressing social issues, of which AIDS is but one.  
However, forgiving debt is but one step of the process.  It is important to stop giving aid 
in its entirety.  African regimes must become self-sufficient.  As it stands, many regimes 
survive mainly on external funding.  Even more twisted is the fact that most of this 
external lending is necessary to pay off debt engendered by foreign lending in the first 
place.  Nevertheless, regimes can continue to survive without considering society as long 
as they keep receiving external funding.  Simply shifting the recipients of external aid is 
not necessarily the answer; those in the center are maneuvering into positions in NGOs to 
keep receiving foreign largesse.  Forcing the center to look inward in an attempt to 
generate revenue is necessary.  This will result in one of two alternatives; either the 
center will reconnect and begin extracting necessary revenue, governing on a historically 
limited scale or it will simply cease to exist, unable to survive without it.  These two steps 
combined are the most important ones outside actors can take in their dealing with Africa 
in letting the domestic struggles sort themselves out and helping true stability return. 
The United States and other powers want stability in Africa.  Stability means less 
expenditure and in some cases, such as Rwanda, less embarrassment.  Yet, there are 
many factors involved.  Multi-nationals will continue dealing with regimes such as 
Angola and Liberia where they can extract profit.  It is not realistic to expect them to 
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cease their business arrangements for the collective good of Africa.  Perhaps increased 
awareness will lead to eventual public pressure for them to withdraw until historically 
grounded regimes can develop.  This is unlikely, but it is nice to think about the 
possibilities.  Where the United States and other powers can most effectively make a 
difference is with their influence within the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.  By erasing debt and ceasing loans the United States and others can best help 
Africa sort its own domestic problems.  This should be done even though many of the 
current African regimes, for fear of their own survival, will protest vehemently against 
such measures, calling the United States and others racist nations sitting silently while 
Africa crumbles.  Africa cannot rebuild until it crumbles.   
The western powers need to allow Africa a potential plunge into war and possibly 
resort to authority based on very low levels of centralization.  The modern African 
regime can only develop by reconnecting itself to the village and placing itself within the 
African historical context.  It appears as this is becoming a more likely possibility as 
many international actors are withdrawing from war torn areas or simply ignoring entire 
regions. 
In the end, there is no guarantee that such efforts will succeed.  Indeed, Africa has 
been altered in ways that are unlikely to allow it to revert to its precolonial past.  Yet, 
Africa will not be able to effectively meet the challenges ahead if the village is simply 
ignored while the center holds on to whatever power it can, using every means at its 
disposal.  The current policy of not allowing state collapse or border realignment is 
flawed, to not allow for a state to whither goes against Europe’s own experience.  This is 
an area where the west might want to look at is own experience and applicability to the 
African condition.  European states emerged from a process, one that allowed some to 
survive while others perished.  This is one historical commonality that both Africa and 
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